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Under the shareholder primacy model, shareholders exercise voting power because their votes
are wealth maximizing and efficient. The practice of decoupling, or the strategic separation of the
right to vote on a share from the economic ownership of that share, undermines this efficiency.
The decoupled investor’s interests are not aligned with maximizing the value of the corporation
and decoupled investors have, to the detriment of all other shareholders, used their voting power to
dictate inefficient corporate decisions. This Note advocates for proxy card disclosure of decoupled
shares and subsequent voiding of the decoupled votes. In this way, only those shares interested in
wealth maximization are able to influence corporate outcome, restoring efficiency to shareholder
voting.
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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK 
ABOUT VOTING: EFFICIENCY AND THE ERROR 
IN EMPTY VOTING 
By Patricia Beck* 
Abstract 
Under the shareholder primacy model, shareholders exercise voting 
power because their votes are wealth maximizing and efficient. The 
practice of decoupling, or the strategic separation of the right to vote 
on a share from the economic ownership of that share, undermines 
this efficiency. The decoupled investor’s interests are not aligned 
with maximizing the value of the corporation and decoupled 
investors have, to the detriment of all other shareholders, used their 
voting power to dictate inefficient corporate decisions. This Note 
advocates for proxy card disclosure of decoupled shares and 
subsequent voiding of the decoupled votes. In this way, only those 
shares interested in wealth maximization are able to influence 
corporate outcome, restoring efficiency to shareholder voting. 
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III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: RESTORING EFFICIENCY THROUGH 





In early 2001, Perry Corporation (“Perry”), a hedge fund, was a 
substantial shareholder of Rubicon Ltd. (“Rubicon”).1 By June 2001, 
however, Perry publically announced that it had whittled down its 
sizeable investment to that below the threshold requiring disclosure.2 
Surprisingly, a year later, Perry disclosed a sizeable holding in Rubicon 
conveniently in time to vote at Rubicon’s annual meeting.3 
Unbeknownst to Rubicon, Perry had previously engaged in derivatives 
transactions designed to decouple the economic interest of their shares 
from the attendant voting rights.4 Decoupled of its voting rights, Perry’s 
holding diminished in size albeit temporarily. Then, before the annual 
meeting, Perry easily unwound its derivative transactions, reuniting the 
shares with their voting rights and consolidating its once again sizeable 
holding in time to influence the vote.5 In short, Perry had engaged in 
“decoupling,” or the strategic separation of the right to vote from the 
economic ownership of shares.6 
Decoupling has existed undocumented for an undetermined amount 
of time.7 Yet, in 2005, Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy first identified 
situations in which investors used derivatives to vary their economic 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 836 (2006) (discussing 
the Perry-Rubicon situation). 
 2. Because Rubicon is a New Zealand company, it is required to disclose 5% 
ownership positions pursuant to New Zealand law, similar to that of Section 13(d) in 
the United States. See id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 836-37. 
 5. Id. at 827. 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 815-16. 
 7. Because decoupling is “largely unregulated and often unseen,” determining its 
full extent and historical presence is difficult to measure. Id. at 818-19. Nevertheless, 
Hu and Black have been able to identify eighty-two decoupling examples from 1988 
through 2008. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and 
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 661-81 (2008). 
2016]    WHAT WE TALK ABOUT 213 
                             WHEN WE TALK ABOUT VOTING 
interests while retaining voting power, or engaged in decoupling 
practices.8 Next, Henry Hu and Bernard Black comprehensively 
discussed the phenomenon of decoupling in their seminal article, The 
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership.9 
Hu and Black referred to decoupling as the “new vote buying” because 
it consists of a combination of “conventional” transactions that are by 
themselves not suspect: the purchasing of shares and using derivatives 
for hedging purposes.10 The results, however, are anything but 
conventional.11 
For the decoupled investor who maintains voting rights but who has 
otherwise abrogated economic ownership, decoupling may have many 
benefits, chief among them personal profit.12 Corporate law rewards an 
interest in profit maximization so long as it is aligned with maximizing 
firm value.13 Under the shareholder primacy model of corporate law, 
shareholders are given the ability to vote on corporate decisions 
precisely because they are more tied to the economic risk in the 
venture.14 As the “residual claimants,” they are interested in maximizing 
firm value more than any other corporate party.15 Shareholder votes are 
thus deemed efficient because their decisions will be directed at wealth 
maximization.16 The decoupled investor, on the other hand, has severed 
herself from the economic interest of her shares and is therefore not 
interested in maximizing the value of those shares.17 And despite her 
disinterest in wealth maximization, the decoupled investor still retains 
the right to vote on those shares—her votes are inefficient.18 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 
789-94 (2005) (describing seven situations where shareholders use derivatives to 
decouple their voting rights from economic interest). 
 9. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816. 
 10. See id. at 818. 
 11. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 44. 
 13. See infra note 23. 
 14. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A 
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) 
(“The case for the one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match 
economic incentives with voting power . . .”). 
 15. See infra note 26. 
 16. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 39. 
 18. See infra note 39. 
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This Note argues that the votes associated with decoupled shares 
should be excluded from corporate voting. To accomplish this, federal 
disclosure rules should require that investors disclose the extent of their 
shares that are decoupled in the event of a vote.19 Aware of the 
decoupled votes, the corporation can therefore exclude those from the 
final vote tally, curing the inefficiency problem by only counting those 
votes that are interested in maximizing firm value.20 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the efficiency 
rationale underlying the shareholder primacy model, and how 
decoupling breaks the efficiency link in its various forms. Part II 
discusses the existing disclosure requirements, how decoupling evades 
those requirements, and critiques existing proposals to address 
decoupling. Part III describes the author’s proposal to mandate the 
disclosure of decoupled shares on shareholder voting proxy cards and to 
exclude them from the vote. 
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS AN EFFICIENT MEANS OF WEALTH 
MAXIMIZATION 
This part begins by exploring the shareholder primacy model and 
the crucial efficiency link between shareholders’ interest in wealth 
maximization and their right to vote on corporate decisions. The 
remainder of this part then discusses decoupling, its forms and 
techniques, and how it breaks the efficiency link. 
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
Corporations exist to generate wealth.21 Maximization of firm value 
in turn maximizes social welfare.22 Accordingly, corporate law achieves 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.”). 
 22. Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, On 
Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden 
Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (2013) [hereinafter Barry et al.] (arguing that 
the “justification for giving shareholders control rights is that doing so maximizes the 
value of the corporation, which in turn maximizes social welfare”); see also Black & 
Kraakman, supra note 14, at 1945-46. 
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this goal most efficiently by allocating voting rights to those who are 
uniquely situated to pursue firm wealth maximization: the corporation’s 
shareholders.23 This is referred to as the shareholder primacy model.24 A 
long line of legal and economic scholarship supports and reinforces the 
wisdom of shareholder primacy.25 
Shareholder primacy is efficient because shareholders are more 
invested, and therefore more interested, in wealth maximization than 
any other corporate party.26 As both the true owners of the corporate 
property27 and the “residual claimants” of the corporation, shareholders 
reap the benefit or bear the brunt of the loss in firm value.28 They will 
vote to their benefit by maximizing firm value.29 Yet, shareholders 
exercise virtually no control over the corporation’s general business and 
affairs, which are instead managed “by or under the direction of a board 
of directors.”30 This “efficiency link,” giving voting power to the 
corporate party who is most interested in maximizing firm value, 
ensures that the business and affairs are wealth-maximizing.31 For 
instance, major corporate transactions or “fundamental changes” (such 
as liquidations, large asset sales, and mergers) that are most likely to 
directly affect firm value are subject to approval by shareholder votes.32 
Under the default rule, a shareholder is entitled to vote in 
proportion to the size of her investment.33 Shareholders vote either in 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 66-72; see also Robert B. 
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 136 (2009) 
(discussing how “regulation of voting behavior also occurs to ensure the correct 
alignment between voting and the common welfare”). 
 24. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 408 (2002). 
 25. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1112; see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 
14, at 1945-46; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983). While the shareholder primacy model is generally 
accepted, it is not undisputed. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 441-42. 
 26. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 67-70. 
 27. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 408 (“[U]nder the traditional conception of 
shareholder primacy, shareholders are said to own the corporation.”). 
 28. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 67-70. 
 29. See id. 
 30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141. 
 31. See supra note 23. 
 32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275(b), 271(a), 251(c). 
 33. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 450. Virtually all state corporate codes have 
adopted this one-share-one-vote standard as the default rule. Id. at 453. 
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person or by proxy, although most shareholders vote by proxy.34 A 
proxy is a shareholder’s grant of authority to another to vote her 
shares.35 Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
has broad authority to regulate the issuance of proxies.36 
B. DECOUPLING OF VOTING RIGHTS FROM ECONOMIC OWNERSHIP 
Decoupling refers to a variety of practices in which a shareholder 
may separate, or decouple, the voting rights attached to the economic 
ownership of her shares.37 Decoupling consists of two conventional 
transactions: buying shares and hedging those shares.38 The combination 
of those transactions results in breaking the efficiency link: those parties 
with voting power are not affected by an increase in firm value and 
therefore not interested in maximizing firm value.39 Although it may not 
benefit the corporation, decoupling is attractive to an investor for a 
number of reasons.40 Decoupling allows an investor to hedge her 
investment and minimize her exposure to market changes.41 Decoupling 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 443. 
 35. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW 
STUDENTS 292 (4th ed. 2006). A shareholder may also sell the voting rights attached to 
her shares. Such “vote-buying” is permissible, but somewhat suspect as “easily 
susceptible of abuse,” and is therefore subject to a test for “intrinsic fairness.” Schreiber 
v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n. Issuers with a class of securities registered under Section 12 
of the Exchange Act are required to comply with federal rules governing the solicitation 
of proxies. Id. Rules 14a-4 and 14a-5 deal with the formatting of the proxy cards (font 
type, box to check for approval, disapproval, or abstention for each matter voted upon). 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-4, 5 (2014). In the case of fundamental changes, Rule 14a-3 
requires disclosure of information mandated by Schedule 14 for specific transaction. 17 
C.F.R § 240.14a-3 (2014). Broadly, Rule 14a-6 requires that the preliminary proxy 
statement and ballot be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ten days 
before the final copies are expected to be delivered to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-6 (2014). 
 37. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816. 
 38. See id. at 818. 
 39. See id. at 815 (arguing that negative economic ownership “gives the investor an 
incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share price”); see also Martin & 
Partnoy, supra note 8, at 809-10 (referring to this situation as “voting arbitrage”). 
 40. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1120-29 (discussing the potential 
problems and benefits of decoupling). 
 41. JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 119 (2014). 
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also enables an investor to strategically evade disclosing her investment 
position.42 Unknown to her fellow shareholders, she is able to covertly 
influence major corporate decisions.43 Finally, decoupling can yield 
investors a large personal profit.44 
The hedged position may be achieved through traditional securities 
or derivative instruments such as forward, future, and swap contracts.45 
A derivative is a security whose value depends on, or derives from, the 
value of another asset or financial or economic variable.46 Through the 
use of derivative instruments, it has become cheaper and easier for an 
investor to engage in decoupling.47 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to engage in decoupling is by 
purchasing shares in the corporation while simultaneously hedging that 
investment by “shorting” those shares.48 To short shares is to bet that the 
value of those shares will decrease.49 For example, an investor may 
purchase equity or equity derivatives that increase in value as the 
corporation’s share price falls.50 Her economic interest is decoupled 
from her right to vote because the hedge abrogates her investment in the 
value of those shares and she is left only with the right to vote.51 In such 
a situation, the efficiency link has been broken: the investor has the right 
to vote but is not interested in maximizing firm value.52 On the contrary, 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1126. 
 43. See HAAS, supra note 41, at 119-20; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121. 
 44. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Loophole Lets a Foot in the Door, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2008, at C1 (“So why do investors go to such extremes to mask their trading? 
Money – lots of it.”). 
 45. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114-15. 
 46. See HAAS, supra note 41, at 119. 
 47. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815 (explaining how derivatives have made it 
“cheaper and easier” to engage in decoupling). 
 48. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False 
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 484-85 (2008). 
 49. An investor who sells short borrows a security from a broker, sells it and buys 
an identical security to give back to the broker. The short is profitable if the price of the 
security drops after the investor sells it and before she buys another to give back to her 
broker. See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 167 (2d ed. 2011). 
 50. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 48, at 484-85. 
 51. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 818 (describing how an investor buys shares 
in the open market and uses derivatives to offset the economic ownership of those 
shares, the investor “is left only with voting ownership”). 
 52. See supra note 39. 
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because she is betting that the firm value will decrease, she is interested 
in decreasing firm value.53 
Another way of decoupling involves futures and forward 
contracts.54 Futures and forward contracts create an obligation under 
which the purchaser is obligated to buy, and the seller is obligated to 
sell, the underlying asset at a particular price (“forward price”) on a 
particular date in the future (“expiration date”).55 In the period from 
when the parties enter into the contract until the expiration date, the 
seller has no real economic interest in the shares she is selling because 
she neither benefits nor suffers from any change in their value.56 
However, until the expiration date, she is still the legal owner of those 
shares and retains the right to vote on them.57 If the seller enters into a 
forward or futures contract in which she agrees to sell more shares than 
she presently owns, in order to fulfill the contract she will need to 
purchase the shares-promised-yet-not-yet-owned on the market.58 She 
therefore desires that the market price of those shares she will purchase 
to fulfill the contract be lower than the amount to be paid – she is 
interested in decreasing firm value.59 Again, the efficiency link has been 
broken because she retains the right to vote those shares while she is 
incentivized to vote to decrease their value.60 
Hu and Black characterize such an investor’s position in different 
ways, depending on the degree of separation of the voting rights and 
economic interest.61 “Hidden ownership” refers to situations in which an 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See id. 
 54. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114-16. 
 55. See HAAS, supra note 41, at 131. Broadly speaking, the difference between 
forward and futures contract is that forward contracts are privately-negotiated 
agreements, while futures contracts are standardized and publicly-traded. Id. at 131, 
133. Forward and futures contracts are designed to decrease the contracting parties’ 
exposure to price fluctuations of the underlying asset. Id. If the underlying asset is a 
security, then the contract is a derivative instrument. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 
1113. However, should the asset’s spot price rise above the forward price, the contract 
becomes valuable to the purchaser, who can sell the underlying asset for a profit 
immediately after executing the contract. Id. 
 56. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1113-14. 
 57. See id. at 1114. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See supra note 39. 
 61. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815-16 (describing and classifying 
decoupling’s different forms). 
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investor’s economic interest exceeds her voting rights.62 Similarly, 
“hidden (morphable) ownership” is a combination of hidden ownership 
with acquired control of voting rights.63 “Empty voting,” perhaps the 
most well known instance of decoupling, refers to situations in which an 
investor’s voting rights exceed her economic interest.64 Extreme cases of 
empty voting, in which an investor has voting rights despite having 
negative economic interest in the corporation, are referred to as 
“negative voting.”65 Negative voting is extreme not only because of its 
negative ownership but also because the position gives the investor the 
incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share price.66 
Though these types of ownership are dissimilar, they are alike in that 
they all break the efficiency link between a shareholder’s interest in 
wealth maximization and voting power.67 For example, if the hedged 
position the investor used to short her shares completely offsets her 
economic investment in the corporation, she will have become an empty 
voter.68 Where the hedged position is strong enough, however, her 
hedged position may outweigh her investment in the corporation and she 
is a negative voter.69 In this situation, the negative voter is not interested 
in maximizing firm value because it is more profitable for her to pursue 
the interests of her hedged position.70 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1115; Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 825. 
 63. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815-16. An example of morphable ownership 
is the following: A and B enter into a contract (a futures contract) in which B will buy 
A’s shares for a particular price on a particular date and A informally agrees to vote the 
share as B wishes until that date. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1116. 
 64. The votes are “empty” because the shares have been “emptied” of the 
economic risk normally inherent in those voting rights. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, 
at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114; see also Martin & Partnoy, supra note 8, at 
780 (referring to the situation as “encumbered shares” rather than empty voting). 
 65. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815. 
 66. Id. at 815. An example of negative ownership is the following: A and B enter 
into a futures contract in which A agrees to sell to B more shares than she presently 
owns. In order to fulfill the contract, B will have to purchase the shares promised-but-
not-yet-owned. Therefore, B desires that the price at which she buys theses shares is 
less than the price that she will be paid – she desires that the stock’s value decreases. 
Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114 (“[T]he empty voter actively wants the corporation 
to decrease in value.”). 
 67. See supra note 39. 
 68. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114. 
 69. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114. 
 70. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114. 
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Examples of such anti-wealth maximization behavior exist and are 
well documented as cautionary market tales.71 Take, for example, the 
story of Henderson Land.72 In 2006, Henderson Land offered to buy all 
outstanding shares of its publicly-held affiliate, Henderson Investment, 
for a substantial premium.73 Because Henderson Investment 
shareholders were in favor of the buyout, Henderson Investment’s share 
price increased substantially and the buyout seemed highly likely.74 Yet 
to the market’s surprise, Henderson Investment’s shareholders rejected 
Henderson Land’s offer.75 In response, Henderson Investment’s share 
price dropped significantly after the vote was announced.76 Reports later 
emerged that one or more hedge funds had borrowed enough Henderson 
Investment shares to vote against the buyout.77 Confident that their votes 
would block the transaction, the hedge fund (or funds) had bet that the 
value of Henderson Investment’s shares would drop and shorted their 
shares.78 Thus the hedge fund (or funds), for its personal benefit, 
manipulated the vote to block a deal that would have benefited other 
shareholders.79 
Also consider the example of hedge fund Perry’s80 involvement in 
Mylan Laboratories’ (“Mylan”) acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals 
(“King”).81 In 2004, Mylan announced an agreement to acquire King, 
but the merger was subject to approval of both companies’ 
shareholders.82 Perry owned seven million shares in King and stood to 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See, e.g., infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834-35. 
 73. See id. at 834; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1105. 
 74. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834. 
 75. See id.; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1106. 
 76. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834. 
 77. See id. at 834-35. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 835. 
 80. See id. at 842-43. It is worth noting that Perry is somewhat of a repeat-player 
with decoupling. Perry was involved in both the Rubicon example, supra notes 1-6, and 
the King-Mylan acquisition, infra notes 80-89. In addition, the hedge fund Children’s 
Investment Fund, while headed by a Perry alumnus, was involved in Deutsche Boerse’s 
attempted acquisition of the London Stock Exchange. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 
842-43. 
 81. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive 
Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 46 (2006) (“[T]he Perry deal has become a rallying 
cry for regulating hedge funds . . .”). 
 82. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 828. 
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make a $28 million profit if the merger went through.83 Mylan 
shareholders still had to approve the deal, however, and Mylan’s shares 
had dropped sharply when the deal was announced.84 To ensure that 
Mylan voted in favor of the merger, Perry acquired a 9.9% voting stake 
in Mylan, but hedged its stake in Mylan through a series of equity swaps 
and “other undisclosed transactions.”85 Thereby, Perry had acquired 
voting power in Mylan to make sure Mylan voted the way it wanted, but 
had emptied its stake in Mylan of economic interest.86 Absent any 
economic interest in Mylan, Perry desired to complete the deal even if 
Mylan’s firm value would suffer.87 Perry was voting against the wealth-
maximizing interests of other Mylan shareholders.88 Carl Icahn, a large 
Mylan shareholder who had opposed the acquisition, sued Perry for 
voting without any true economic ownership and for having a negative 
ownership.89 
The Henderson Land and Perry examples differ in their decoupling 
strategies but are similar examples of hedge funds surreptitiously 
dictating the outcome of major transactions for their personal benefit to 
the detriment of other shareholders.90 Or, as one commentator described 
it, influencing the outcome of shareholder elections for one’s own 
benefit at the expense of the corporation allowed hedge funds to 
“‘hijack’ shareholder elections for their own private gain.”91 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 48, at 485. 
 87. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 828-29. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. The lawsuit was well publicized. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Icahn Cries Foul 
at Perry’s No-Risk Play in Takeover Fight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at C1; Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Icahn Accuses a Hedge Fund of Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2004, at C1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Nothing Ventured, Everything Gained, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2004, at C1. But the lawsuit became moot when Mylan called off the 
acquisition. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 829. 
 90. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 835. 
 91. Jonathan Katz, Note, Barbarians at the Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to 
Acquire Low Cost Corporate Influence and Its Effect on Shareholder Apathy, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1483, 1516 (2006). 
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II. FAILURE OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES TO CAPTURE 
DECOUPLING, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This part begins by describing the existing federal disclosure 
regime and how decoupling allows an investor to strategically evade 
disclosure obligations. It then considers existing proposals for reform—
enhanced federal disclosure rules and bylaw amendments aimed at 
capturing decoupling—but finds that they fail to remedy decoupling’s 
inefficiency problem. 
A. THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REGIME 
Disclosure rules are the “cornerstone” of modern securities 
regulation.92 The disclosure regime is built on the strong belief that 
transparency leads to greater market efficiency.93 The purpose of 
federally mandated disclosure is to “alert the marketplace” of other 
investors who may be able to exert control over corporate decisions.94 
When called upon to disclose information, an investor is largely 
required to reveal her investment portfolio.95 A disclosure-based regime 
therefore enables more informed decisions and improves market 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1153; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory 
Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2000) (“Mandatory 
disclosure is a – if not the – defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation.”). This 
is not to suggest that mandatory disclosure is not without its critics. See, e.g., Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 
YALE L.J. 2359, 2372-88 (1998) (arguing for the removal of mandatory disclosure 
requirements). 
 93. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156 (arguing that increased 
transparency of derivatives and financial markets generally could improve market 
outcomes). 
 94. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he 
purpose of section 13(d) is to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or 
accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a 
shift in corporate control . . . .”). 
 95. Under Schedule 13D, a shareholder is required to disclose her identity and 
background (including any criminal convictions), the source of funds of her holding, 
and any plans or proposals she has for the company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2014); 
see also, Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1154 (describing how federally mandated 
disclosure rules largely reveal the portfolios of “major market participants” and other 
participants are then “able to discern what each other’s ownership and control rights 
are”). 
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outcomes.96 Generally, disclosure is not mandatory until the size of an 
investor’s holding meets a threshold amount.97 The size of an investor’s 
holding is based on her “beneficial ownership” of shares.98 
However, beneficial ownership is determined in relation to voting 
interest, not economic interest, and does not include informal voting 
power such as hidden (morphable) ownership.99 Consequently, 
decoupling, especially those relying on derivatives, often remains 
untouched by federal disclosure rules.100 Despite the attempt to include 
contracts or other arrangements contributing to the size of a 
shareholder’s position within the definition of beneficial ownership, the 
use of derivatives in structuring a holding often places that holding 
outside the scope of the disclosure rules.101 Short positions, for instance, 
whether they are in shares or derivatives, do not trigger disclosure under 
Schedule 13D.102 Similarly, the use of swaps likely does not trigger 
disclosure under either 13D or 13G.103 Therefore, an investor who holds 
just under the 5% threshold as well as equity swaps conveying an 
additional 11% economic ownership, putting her actual holdings above 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156-59. 
 97. See infra note 98. 
 98. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 866-67. Such beneficial ownership is subject 
to mandatory disclosure in the following ways: institutional investors must disclose 
their positions in public companies on Form 13F, SEC Form 13F, Information Required 
of Institutional Investment Managers Pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Rules Thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 [hereinafter 
Form 13F]; shareholders must disclose if they hold a position of 5% or more under 
Schedule 13D if active shareholders, Schedule 13D, § 240.13d-101 [hereinafter 13D], 
and under Schedule 13G if passive, Schedule 13G, § 240.13d-102 [hereinafter 13G]; 
insiders and shareholders with a 10% or larger position must disclose under section 16 
of the Exchange Act (“Section 16”), Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. 78p (2012). 
 99. It does, however, cover sole or shared voting or investment power acquired 
directly or indirectly through a contract or less formal arrangement. See Exchange Act 
Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. 
 100. Disclosure obligations were “not crafted with derivatives in mind.” Barry et al., 
supra note 22, at 1154. 
 101. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 864-65. Share-lending may trigger disclosure 
under 13D, but not under 13G. See id. at 868. Record date capture, by itself, is unlikely 
to trigger disclosure under Schedule 13G. See id. at 868. Disclosure is more likely 
under Section 16. See, e.g., id. at 872. Equity swaps and equity derivatives must be 
disclosed and therefore shares hedged with derivatives would be disclosed. See, e.g., id. 
at 873-74. 
 102. See id. at 867. 
 103. See id. at 868; see also supra note 98 (discussing 13D and 13G). 
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the disclosure threshold, will not be subject to the disclosure 
requirements.104 Indeed, such hidden (morphable) ownership is often 
employed to shield ownership from public view.105 
Given the Henderson Land and Perry examples, it is clear that 
investors employ decoupling practices to strategically structure their 
holdings to circumvent disclosure obligations that would otherwise be 
applicable to holdings of that size.106 Investors’ reliance on the use of 
derivatives has only made decoupling cheaper and easier.107 In addition, 
because decoupling evades disclosure obligations, it has historically 
been “largely unregulated and unseen.”108 Thus, decoupling also detracts 
from the efficiency benefits of a transparent market.109 
B. CURRENT PROPOSALS 
1. Expansion of Disclosure Rules to Capture Decoupling 
Hu and Black advocate for enhanced federally-mandated disclosure 
as a remedy for decoupling.110 They propose an “integrated ownership 
disclosure” solution that they feel both simplifies and builds upon the 
existing regulatory structure.111 In addressing the use of derivatives, their 
proposal consists largely of including direct and synthetic holdings 
within economic ownership of shares, and extending Section 16 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See Hu & Black, supra note 1 at 868. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 872. 
 106. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121 (“Decoupling makes it easier for an investor 
to structure her holdings in a way that circumvents regulation . . . exploit any gaps in 
the regulatory net.”); see also supra notes 1-6, 69-86 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815. 
 108. Id. at 818. 
 109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Thomas C. Pearson & 
Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: 
Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1 (Fall 
2007) (arguing that empty voting is one area, of many, in which regulation can help 
achieve greater transparency and deter inappropriate practices). Even more troubling is 
the fact that decoupling is associated with hedge funds and extremely wealthy investors 
and insiders, suggesting that generally applicable disclosure costs are only borne by 
those who cannot afford to buy out of them. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121-22; 
Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815. 
 110. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 864. At the same time, Hu and Black 
acknowledge that a more substantive response may be needed. Id. 
 111. See id. at 876. 
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disclosures to reach shareholders with derivative positions who would 
report on Form 13F and Schedules 13D and 13G.112 The extent of the 
information disclosed would be assessed against a sort of “ordinary 
derivatives dealer” standard, or enough that a dealer with access to 
information on the volatility and “other pricing parameters” could assess 
the derivative’s value.113 Hu and Black would also require disclosure of 
share lending and borrowing practices, even if those practices are 
unaccompanied by economic ownership.114 
Respectfully, while Hu and Black’s proposal would be more 
effective at capturing decoupling than the current system, it does not 
adequately deal with the fundamental flaw in allowing decoupled 
investors to vote and impact the outcome of major corporate decisions. 
115 In other words, the efficiency link is still missing.116 Even if federal 
disclosure rules were expanded to encompass decoupled holdings, 
investors who are not interested in wealth maximization would still be 
able to vote.117 Disclosure will not solve inefficient voting practices.118 
In addition, Hu and Black’s proposal of enhanced disclosure obligations 
increases transaction costs.119 Given that individual shareholders already 
face significant transaction costs in acquiring and processing 
information, further costly disclosure requirements will reduce 
efficiency by discouraging investors from evaluating the available 
information.120 
Nevertheless, a disclosure-based solution such as Hu and Black’s is 
attractive for many reasons. One reason is that it furthers the 
longstanding commitment to transparency as the means to a fair and 
efficient market.121 Other commentators have shown support for Hu and 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 878. 
 113. Id. at 879. 
 114. Id. at 878. 
 115. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Katz, supra note 91, at 1516-17 (rejecting enhanced disclosure as a 
solution for decoupling because “the rational response of shareholders that learn the 
intricacies of hedge fund involvement in their corporate elections [is] abstention from 
voting”). Even Hu and Black, in advocating for their “integrated ownership disclosure” 
proposal, acknowledge that enhanced ownership disclosure must be “crafted with 
sensitivity to the costs of disclosure.” Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 819. 
 120. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1158. 
 121. See supra note 93. 
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Black’s “integrated ownership disclosure” proposal in advocating for 
similar solutions.122 Ultimately, because decoupling is naturally 
“unseen,” any solution will require some form of disclosure.123 Indeed, 
disclosure would allow observers to identify the existence and frequency 
of decoupling.124 Otherwise, it will continue to exist below the radar, 
undetected and untouchable.125 
2. Bylaw Amendments 
In the absence of a satisfactory regulatory response, corporations 
are taking measures to protect themselves and their shareholders from 
empty and negative voters.126 Some scholars have proposed that 
corporations force disclosure of synthetic positions as a requirement for 
eligibility to nominate directors.127 For instance, in 2008, Sara Lee 
amended its bylaws to require a shareholder who nominates a board 
member or submits a proposal that could alter the path of the business to 
disclose if the shareholder has “hedged its ownership” or has “any short 
position in the stock.”128 Similarly, Coach amended its bylaws to require 
any shareholder’s “hedging activities” to be divulged upon submitting a 
proposal.129 This solution attempts to address empty voting by counting 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See, e.g., Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund 
Regulation: Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & 
EMP. L. 833 (2008) (arguing that the SEC can regulate by enforcing disclosure of voting 
and economic stakes in the form of 13D filings); Sean M. Donahue, Lessons Learned 
from CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management and Proposals for Reform, 
4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 221 (2010) (arguing that the SEC should amend Rule 
13d-3(a) to require disclosure of parties’ holdings in equity swaps and sterilization of 
votes in 13(d) context). 
 123. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156. 
 125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership 
from Control, 33 SEATTLE L. U. REV. 931, 943-44 (2010). 
 127. See, e.g., Elina Khasina, Note, Disclosure of “Beneficial Ownership” of 
Synthetic Positions in Takeover Campaigns, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 904, 905-06 
(2009); Charles M. Nathan, Developments in Takeover Defenses, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 23, 2008), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2008/ 
10/23/developments-in-takeover-defenses/ [http://perma.cc/NP6P-DDA7]. 
 128. Matt Andrejczak, Sara Lee, Coach Set Rules to Spot Shareholder Actions, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 2, 2008, 6:30 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sara-lee-
coach-set-rules-to-deter-devious-shareholders [http://perma.cc/6ZE2-JFNK]. 
 129. Id. 
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shares referenced in any sort of derivative transaction, rather than just 
shares actually owned, towards beneficial ownership.130 
These bylaw amendments have the benefit of being less costly than 
Hu & Black’s “integrated ownership disclosure” proposal because the 
expense of gathering the required information and disclosing it to the 
corporation is lower.131 Unlike the obligations under federal disclosure 
rules, the information would not need to be disclosed periodically.132 
The investor would not need to continuously monitor her beneficial 
ownership and promptly disclose any updates on any changes in the size 
of her holding.133 Rather, a Coach or Sara Lee investor would only need 
to discern and disclose the number of shares hedged on a single, relevant 
date.134 
However, decoupling is only disclosed if management chooses to 
amend the corporation’s bylaws.135 Protection from decoupling would 
therefore vary from corporation to corporation.136 Moreover, disclosure 
of synthetic positions does not directly prevent a decoupled investor 
from using her votes to covertly thwart a wealth-maximizing 
transaction.137 The bylaw amendment solution is reactionary rather than 
prophylactic; it does not prevent the inefficient voting from happening 
but only renders those guilty voters more identifiable for blame.138 
Ultimately, the bylaw amendments suffer from the same shortcoming as 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See William B. Chandler III, Symposium, The Delaware Court of Chancery: 
An Insider’s View of Change and Continuity, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 411, 415 
(referring to these bylaw amendments as a “new wave” of pills). 
 131. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 132. Upon reaching the threshold amount of shares beneficially owned. See, e.g., 
supra note 98. 
 133. A shareholder who is unprepared to disclose proprietary information, especially 
one with a holding just under the threshold amount, needs to monitor the extent of her 
beneficial ownership to ensure that it does not inadvertently rise above the threshold 
amount. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Should the shareholder discover 
that she has risen above the threshold amount and triggered disclosure obligations, she 
must disclose promptly. For instance, under Schedule 13D, a shareholder has ten days. 
17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1(a) (2014). 
 134. As opposed to the substantive proprietary information required under federal 
disclosure obligations. See, e.g., supra note 95. 
 135. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
 136. Protection from decoupling may also depend on legal counsel. See supra note 
127. 
 137. See, e.g., supra note 91. 
 138. Eliminating the “unseen” nature problem. See supra note 108. But the 
inefficiency problem still remains. See supra note 39. 
228 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Hu & Black’s enhanced disclosure solution: neither remedies the 
inefficiency problem in allowing decoupled investors, who are not 
interested in wealth maximization, to vote.139 
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: RESTORING EFFICIENCY THROUGH 
PROXY CARD DISCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION OF DECOUPLED VOTES 
Shareholders are empowered with the right to vote because their 
unique interest in corporate wealth maximization makes their votes 
efficient.140 Absent that interest, it is no longer efficient to give 
shareholders the right to vote.141 Any proposal should bear directly on 
this inefficiency problem. Accordingly, pursuant to its authority under 
Section 14 of the Exchange Act, the SEC should mandate that 
shareholders disclose on proxy cards, under penalty of voiding their 
votes, the amount of shares for which they are entitled to vote that are 
hedged or decoupled on the day of the vote.142 Those decoupled votes 
would then be excluded from the vote.143 This proxy card disclosure 
proposal directly cures the inefficiency problem by only allowing those 
votes that are tied to wealth maximizing shares to influence corporate 
outcome.144 Those shares that are not wealth maximizing, such as those 
that are shorted, would thus not be able to dictate corporate outcome.145 
This proposal not only restores the efficiency link of shareholder 
voting and wealth maximization, but also imposes minimal costs.146 The 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See supra note 39. 
 140. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. 
 141. This Note emphasizes that the hedging behavior associated with decoupling is 
not by itself inefficient. Rather, only when that behavior is contemporaneous with a 
vote, has the behavior rendered the voting inefficient. See supra note 39. 
 142. Under Section 14, the SEC has broad authority to issue rules governing the 
issuance of proxy cards. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The proxy card 
disclosure proposed here is similar to that enforced by the Sarah Lee and Coach bylaw 
amendments, but is expanded beyond director nomination and shareholder proposals to 
include all opportunities subject to shareholder approval, including major corporate 
transactions. See supra notes 127-29. 
 143. Thus excluding those inefficient votes. See supra notes 52-53 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Thus preventing the “hijacking” problem of corporate actions for inefficient 
purposes. See supra note 91. 
 146. See infra note 150. It is certainly less costly than federally mandated disclosure. 
See, e.g., supra notes 133-34. 
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proxy card disclosure is different from the disclosure currently 
mandated under federal disclosure rules.147 Where the latter is designed 
to alert the marketplace of voting power, this proposal is designed to 
alert the shareholders of the corporation to those other shareholders 
whose voting interests are compromised.148 As such, the proxy card 
disclosure is much more limited in scope, commands less effort, and 
demands less sensitive information from the investor.149 Where federal 
disclosure rules reveal proprietary information across an investor’s 
entire investment portfolio, this proposal only mandates disclosure of a 
fixed number of shares on a specific date.150 Thus, the information 
disclosed is neither proprietary nor cumbersome.151 
Moreover, the costs of obtaining this information are relatively low 
in comparison to federal disclosure rules that require monitoring and 
updating disclosure as the investor’s positions change.152 In contrast to 
federal disclosure obligations, which apply at all times, this proposal’s 
obligations are triggered only in the event of a shareholder vote.153 In 
this way, this proposal burdens decoupled shareholders with disclosure 
obligations only when it is necessary.154 
The idea of excluding some shareholders’ votes may seem radical. 
However, such behavior is not novel in corporate law.155 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 149. The proposed proxy card disclosure does not incur the monitoring costs 
inherent in federally mandated disclosure rules. See infra note 152 and accompanying 
text. Nor does this proposal call upon an investor to bear the costs of revealing sensitive 
and proprietary information. See, e.g., supra note 95. 
 150. See, e.g., supra note 95. The information disclosed of would only be the 
number of hedged or decoupled shared owned on the date of the vote. Similar to the 
bylaw amendments, because this number is fixed and static, it does not require constant 
updating. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 95. 
 152. Information disclosed under federal securities laws needs to be updated. For 
example, an investor who beneficially owns more than 5% of a corporation needs to 
disclose certain information under 13D after meeting that 5% threshold. See supra notes 
95, 98. Such an investor must also “promptly” file amendments to his 13D disclosures 
is if there is any material change in the facts disclosed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (2014). 
 153. And therefore do not require updating. See supra note 152; see also supra notes 
132-33 and accompanying text. 
 154. Disclosure obligations would be limited to events such as fundamental changes 
or major corporate transactions in which shareholders have a heightened interest in 
wealth maximization. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., supra note 35 (discussing vote-buying). 
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Delaware courts are willing to exclude votes in similar situations in 
which they are concerned about shareholder abuse of the voting 
franchise.156 Furthermore, excluding the compromised votes of 
decoupled investors would not take anything away from that class of 
shareholders.157 Rather, viewed according to the shareholder primacy 
model, these empty or negative shareholders have not earned the right to 
vote because they do not possess the requisite interest in wealth 
maximization that forms the basis of efficient corporate voting.158 
CONCLUSION 
Decoupled voting is inefficient. Corporate law should promote 
efficiency in the corporate form above all else. Shareholder voting rights 
are justified because when shareholders vote for decisions that are 
wealth maximizing, they are voting efficiently. The decoupled investor 
is not interested in maximizing firm value. In contrast, she acts to the 
detriment of the corporation and her fellow shareholders. 
Enhanced disclosure through SEC rules or amendments to a 
corporation’s bylaws may render decoupling less clandestine and 
underhanded. Indeed, either solution may make decoupling a less 
attractive strategy to some. Still, neither solution is able to cure the 
inefficiency problem inherent in allowing decoupled investors to vote on 
corporate decisions. By allowing only those wealth-maximizing votes to 
participate in deciding the corporation’s future, efficiency is restored to 
the corporate form. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 156. “Similar situations” referring to fundamental changes or major corporate 
transactions where the return of the shareholders’ investment is most critical. See id. 
 157. Because they have “earned” the right to vote according to the underlying 
efficiency rationale of the shareholder primacy model; they do not possess the 
“efficiency link” empowering shareholders with the right to vote. See supra notes 24-31 
and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 39. 
